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1. INTRODUCTION
In 1991, CERN researcher Tim Berners-Lee developed the World Wide Web 
(WWW). That means that, at the time of writing, the WWW – the key char-
acteristic of the modern Internet – turned 20 this year. This is undoubtedly a 
cause for celebration. It is also an interesting point in time to pause to con-
sider what developments have occurred during these 20 years. This paper 
does so with a focus on how the concept of jurisdiction, as applied to the In-
ternet, has developed over the lifespan of the WWW.
The concept of jurisdiction has a relatively long history, obviously pred-
ating both the WWW and the Internet as such. However, not least due to 
the impact extraterritorial jurisdictional claims may have on international 
relations, it has proven to be a fruitful source of controversy and debate. Or 
more  accurately,  there  has  always  been  controversy  associated  with  the 
question of when a court may claim jurisdiction over a particular matter or 
person. Being a core concept affecting every single Internet user, its most 
appropriate application in the Internet era has, as can be expected, been the 
subject of much debate. 
In the 90’s there were significant calls for states to refrain from making 
jurisdictional claims over the Internet and Internet-related activities. A com-
peting view soon developed that, too many forms of Internet conduct fell 
outside the jurisdictional scope of all states, leaving a regulatory vacuum; a 
vacuum that needed to be filled.
As the Internet, and the discussion of Internet regulation, has matured, it 
now – 20 years after the birth of the World Wide Web – seems clear that 
rather than there being no regulation, or under-regulation, the Internet is 
overregulated in that conduct on the global Internet may come under the 
jurisdiction of virtually all states in the world. At the same time, there is a 
recent trend of courts showing reluctance to claim jurisdiction as broadly as 
they arguably can, and perhaps ought to, do under applicable law.
This  paper  discusses,  and  analyses,  a  selection  of  approaches  to  the 
concept of jurisdiction. In doing so, account is taken of both public interna-
tional law and private international law. 
The paper illustrates that, while the subject-matter does not lend itself to 
sharp delineations,  four  different  phases  can be  identified;  each with  its 
own characteristics and tendencies.  Using the mental picture of a pendu-
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lum, these four phases are analysed and some thoughts about future applic-
ations of the concept of jurisdiction to Internet conduct are provided.  
2. THE FIRST PHASE – TERRA NULLIUS
The  early  years,  about  1991  to  1999,  were  characterised  by  hopes  and 
dreams of the WWW-driven Internet as a new frontier, open to everyone 
and regulated by no one. It was an era of freedom during which the abbre-
viation WWW might just as well stood for the “Wild Wild Web”. A defining 
moment took place in 1996 when John Perry Barlow famously unveiled his 
groundbreaking Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace:
Governments  of  the  Industrial  World,  you weary giants  of  flesh and 
steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the fu-
ture, I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. 
You have no sovereignty where we gather...1
The somewhat enigmatic quality of this Declaration may make it look 
amusingly eccentric, or even utterly absurd, today. However, it must be re-
membered that it was presented to the world at a time when people con-
sciously decided to “go” online and spend time “in” Cyberspace for a set 
period of time. Our world today is very different to this. Today, we do not 
go online. Instead our lives, characterised by a continuous Facebook pres-
ence, tablets and Internet-connected kitchen appliances, are immersed in the 
so-called Cyberspace – we are experiencing a conflation of the online and 
offline world. Thus, it is simply no longer clear where Cyberspace starts and 
the “real world” ends.
In any case, the relevant time period saw the emergence of one of the 
most interesting academic “exchanges of ideas” ever in the field of Internet, 
or Cyberspace, law. I am here referring to the series of articles written by 
Johnson and Post on the one hand (taking a cyber libertarian point of view), 
and Jack Goldsmith’s writings on the other hand. In 1996, Johnson and Post 
wrote an article  titled  Law And Borders  -The Rise  of  Law in Cyberspace2 in 
which they argued that the Internet should be viewed as a separate ‘space’,3 
beyond the control of individual nations’ regulation. Moreover, the article  
suggested that, to the extent that this separate space is to be regulated, such 
1 Barlow,  J.P.  1996,  A  Declaration  of  the  Independence  of  Cyberspace, 
https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html,  (Accessed 14 December 2011).
2 Johnson, D., Post, D. 1996,  Law And Borders - The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, Stanford 
Law Review, vol.48, p. 1367.
3 Johnson and Post, Law And Borders, p. 1378.
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regulations would emerge in the form of self-regulation.4 Johnson and Post’-
s reasoning is neatly summarised in the following statement:
Treating Cyberspace as a separate ‘space’ to which distinct laws apply 
should come naturally, because entry into this world of stored online com-
munications occurs through a screen and (usually) a ‘password’ boundary. 
There is a ‘placeness’ to Cyberspace because the messages accessed there 
are  persistent  and  accessible  to  many  people.  You  know  when  you are 
‘there’. No one accidentally strays across the border into Cyberspace. To be 
sure, Cyberspace is not a homogenous place; groups and activities found at 
various online locations possess their own unique characteristics and dis-
tinctions, and each area will likely develop its own set of distinct rules. But 
the  line  that  separates  online  transactions  from our  dealings  in  the  real 
world is just as distinct as the physical boundaries between our territorial 
governments--perhaps more so.
Crossing into Cyberspace is a meaningful act that would make applica-
tion of a distinct ‘law of Cyberspace’ fair to those who pass over the elec-
tronic boundary.5 (footnotes omitted)
Essentially replying to this article, Goldsmith published Against Cyberan-
archy in 1998. In that article he emphasised that:
Cyberspace transactions are no different from ‘real-space’ transnational 
transactions. They involve people in real space in one jurisdiction commu-
nicating with people in real space in other jurisdictions in a way that often 
does good but sometimes causes harm. There is no general normative argu-
ment that supports the immunization of cyberspace activities from territori-
al regulation. And there is every reason to believe that nations can exercise 
territorial  authority  to  achieve  significant  regulatory  control  over  cyber-
space transactions.6
A few additional shots, such as Post’s  Against against cyberanachy, were 
fired in this exchange, however none as significant as the opening salvoes 
mentioned. 
In the space available, it would be quite impossible to account in full for 
this highly interesting debate. However, it can perhaps be said that this ex-
4 Johnson and Post, Law And Borders, p. 1367.
5 Johnson and Post, Law And Borders, p. 1379. 
6 Goldsmith, J.L. 1998, Against Cyberanarchy, University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 65, p. 
1250.
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change of ideas was the dying phase of a serious movement in favour of 
courts not claiming jurisdiction over Internet activities.
Staying with the notion of the Internet as a separate “space”, it is worth 
pointing  out  that,  every  now  and then,  one  sees  articles  expressing  the 
“novel” idea that the Internet is a separate space akin to other international  
spaces such as the High Seas, Antarctica and Outer Space (i.e. as an inde-
pendent international space beyond individual nations’ regulation). But in 
fact, such an idea has not been novel since at least 1998 when Darrel Menthe 
discussed that option in detail. 
These three physical spaces are nothing like cyberspace which is a non-
physical space. The physical/non-physical distinction, however, is only one 
of so many distinctions which could be made between these spaces. After 
all, one could hardly posit three more dissimilar physicalities – the ocean, a  
continent,  and the sky,  What makes them analogous is  not any physical 
similarity, but their international, sovereign quality. These three, like cyber-
space, are international spaces.7 
Having illustrated how there  are  currently three  international  spaces, 
and that ‘cyberspace’ should be the fourth, Menthe describes how the ‘na-
tionality principle’ has been applied to regulate behaviour in these spaces. 
In doing so he notes that all three international spaces rely on the national -
ity principle (e.g. the ‘law of the flag’ from maritime law),8 and makes the 
point that “[s]imilarly, a webpage would be ascribed the nationality of its 
creator, and thus not be subject to the law of wherever it happened to be 
downloaded.”9 In the context of how to determine the nationality of actions 
taking place in ‘cyberspace’, Menthe also notes that “[a] person who follows 
a link is simply a downloader, and is subject to the territorial jurisdiction of 
the keyboard at which he or she sits, as well as the laws governing persons 
of his or her nationality in cyberspace.”10
As is hinted at in the above, academic discourse on the concept of juris-
diction as applied to the Internet was, during the first phase (1991 – 1999), 
mainly focused on two matters: (1) to regulate or not to regulate?, and (2)  
how to regulate? This careful hesitation, and realisation that the Internet is  
‘different’, can also be observed in how some courts approached jurisdic-
7 Menthe, D.C. 1998, Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: A Theory of International Spaces, Michigan 
Telecommunications and Technology Law Review 69, vol. 4, p. 85.
8 Menthe, Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, p. 83. 
9 Menthe, Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, p. 74.
10 Menthe, Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, p. 94.
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tional  claims  over  Internet  conduct  during  this  phase.  For  example,  in 
Macquarie  Bank Limited & Anor v Berg the Supreme Court  of  New South 
Wales11 refused to grant an injunction restraining the defendant from pub-
lishing allegedly defamatory material on a particular website.12 During the 
proceedings, the plaintiffs limited the order sought to publications within 
New South Wales. Despite this, Simpson J refused the order, stating that:
An injunction to restrain defamation in NSW s designed to ensure com-
pliance with the laws of NSW, and to protect the rights of plaintiffs, as those 
rights are defined by the law of NSW. Such an injunction is not designed to 
superimpose the law of NSW relating to defamation on every other state, 
territory and country of the world. Yet that would be the effect of an order 
restraining publication on the Internet. It is not to be assumed that the law 
of defamation in other countries is coextensive with that of NSW, and in-
deed, one knows that it is not. It may very well be that according to the law 
of the Bahamas, Tazhakistan [sic],  or Mongolia, the defendant has an un-
fettered right to publish the material.  To make an order interfering with 
such a right would exceed the proper limits  of the use of the injunctive 
power of this court.13
This conclusion was heavily influenced by the perception that “[o]nce 
published on the Internet material can be received anywhere, and it does 
not lie within the competence of the publisher to restrict the reach of the 
publication.”14
But perhaps the courts’ awareness, during this period, of their own lim-
its  in  dealing  with  new technologies  is  best  summarised  by Preska J  in 
American Libraries Association v. Pataki:
Judges and legislators faced with adapting existing legal standards to the 
novel environment of cyberspace struggle with terms and concepts that the 
average […] five-year-old tosses about with breezy familiarity.15
If we allow ourselves to conclude that this, the first, phase during which 
the pendulum started moving from its point of departure, firmly engrossed 
11 [1999] NSWSC 526.
12 As it turned out, however, the defendant in this action was arguably not the publisher of 
the allegedly defamatory website. During the proceedings a US resident, Fernando Adrian 
Sirio, stated in an affidavit that he was the responsible publisher, and that he had construc-
ted the relevant website  in  conjunction with his studies at University  of California, San 
Diego. It was, however, admitted that Mr Sirio had received some of the material from Mr 
Berg.
13 Macquarie Bank Limited v Berg [1999] NSWSC 526 para 14.
14 Macquarie Bank Limited v Berg [1999] para 12.
15 [1997] S.D.N.Y 969 F.Supp. 160, 170 
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in what can be called un(der)-regulation ,lasted from 1991 to 1999, it is inter-
esting to also consider what happened by way of technological  advance-
ments during that same timeframe. If we do so, we find that, in the time it  
took for the legal world to debate whether or not to regulate the WWW-
driven Internet, and if so, how such regulation should look, technology ad-
vanced significantly. For example, by 1999, there was over 6.5 million web-
sites on the WWW.16
3. THE SECOND PHASE – OVERREGULATION
Major changes in law and legal attitudes do not occur over night, and there 
is ample evidence to show that the second phase of overregulation gradu-
ally commenced during what I here have time-stamped as the first phase. 
For  example,  already  in  the  mid-1990s,  the  Advocate-General’s  office  of 
Minnesota  issued  a  statement  that  ‘[p]ersons  outside  of  Minnesota  who 
transmit information via the Internet knowing that information will be dis-
seminated in Minnesota are subject to jurisdiction in Minnesota courts for 
violations of state criminal and civil laws’17. Nevertheless, by the start of the 
new millennium, courts and legislators had developed a rather aggressive 
attitude as to when they could claim jurisdiction over Internet conduct. Put 
simply, their attitude was that their jurisdictional powers extended to any 
Internet conduct that impacted, or had the potential to impact, on their ter-
ritory or citizens. The global nature of the Internet, combined with a limited  
utilisation of geographical  identifiers,  meant that courts thus could claim 
jurisdiction over virtually all Internet conduct. Looking at it from the posi-
tion of someone who makes content available online, they could come un-
der the jurisdiction of any court in the world and should, thus, abide by all  
the laws of all the countries in the world. The impracticality of this need not  
be elaborated upon.
There is no lack of cases that illustrate the complications that this situ-
ation gives rise to. I will use two of the most prominent cases as examples.
In December 2002, the High Court of Australia decided that Victorian 
businessman, Joseph Gutnick, was allowed to sue US publishing company, 
Dow Jones & Company Inc, in a Victorian court over an allegedly defamat-
16 Zakon, R.H. Date?, Hobbes' Internet Timeline 10.1,  
http://www.zakon.org.robert/internet/timeline/, (Accessed 14 December 2011). 
17 Memorandum of Minnesota Attorney General as reproduced in Jew, B. 1998,  Cyber Juris-
diction – Emerging Issues & Conflict of Law when Overseas Courts Challenge your Web, 
Computers and Law, p. 23.
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ory article available on Dow Jones’ website.18 Further it was decided that 
Victorian  law would  be  applied.  Importantly,  the  majority  of  the  Court 
stated that:
However broad may be the reach of any particular means of communic-
ation, those who make information accessible by a particular method do so 
knowing of the reach that their information may have. In particular, those 
who post information on the World Wide Web do so knowing that the in-
formation they make available is available to all and sundry without any 
geographic restriction.19
The  transatlantic  dispute  between US Internet  company,  Yahoo!,  and 
two French associations,  La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme 
and L’Union Des Etudiants Juifs De Franc, related to Yahoo!’s operation of a 
website which, amongst other things, contained an auction service where 
Nazi memorabilia/junk was frequently on offer.20 The website could be de-
scribed as the Yahoo! family’s ‘flagship’, and in contrast to the country-spe-
cific Yahoo! sites (e.g., www.yahoo.fr), this site was said to be aimed at the 
world at large.21 When La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme et al. 
attempted to have Yahoo! remove the Nazi material from the auction ser-
vice, in accordance with French penal Code,22 Yahoo! refused.
The French Court characterized Yahoo!’s activities as a tort (faute) and is-
sued a civil  law injunction based on the French Code of Civil Procedure. 
The Court  ruled that  Yahoo!  must  take  steps to prevent  French Internet 
users from accessing the sections of the auction site containing Nazi memor-
abilia.23
These cases, like many others, share an important characteristic – they 
highlight a gap between what can be regarded as legitimate grounds for 
claiming jurisdiction and what can be regarded as legitimate grounds for 
expecting another country to recognise and enforce the judgment. In other 
words, in both these cases it could be argued to be legitimate for the courts 
in question to claim jurisdiction over the dispute. At the same time, it can 
18 Dow Jones v. Gutnick  [2002] 210 CLR 575. This case is discussed in much greater detail  
throughout the book.
19 Dow Jones v. Gutnick CLR 575, 605.
20 However, the auction service was not at all specifically designed for the purpose of auction 
Nazi material.
21 A notion backed by the fact that country-specific advertisement was provided on the site.
22 French Penal Code 1791 Article R645-1.
23 International  League  Against  Racism  &  Anti-Semitism  (LICRA)  v.  Yahoo!  Inc.  [2000] 
County Court of Paris.
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also be argued that both cases involve scenarios in which it is perfectly reas-
onable to refuse to recognise and enforce the judgments.
In the Yahoo case, that is exactly what happened. Yahoo! sought and ob-
tained a summary judgment to the effect that US courts would not enforce 
the French decision. While acknowledging France’s right to make law for 
France, J.  Fogel decided in Yahoo!’s  favour, granting the summary judg-
ment, declaring that the ‘First Amendment precludes enforcement within 
the United States of a French order intended to regulate the content of its 
speech over the Internet’.24
The Gutnick case was settled and there was consequently no need for Mr 
Gutnick to seek to have a judgment enforced in the US. Had he had reason 
to do so,  one can expect  that  he would have run into  difficulties  as  US 
courts have a tradition of refusing to recognise and enforce foreign judg-
ments that are viewed as out of line with the US’ strict approach to freedom 
of speech (see also discussion of this below).     
While one can say that the second phase started around the change to 
the new millennium, it is difficult to say when it came to an end. Indeed, it 
may be correct to say that we are still in the second phase. However, for the 
sake of this paper, I suggest that the year 2009 can usefully be seen as the 
end of the second phase. If this is accepted, it is interesting to note that, des-
pite the harsh legal attitudes of the second phase, the number of websites 
increased dramatically from approximately 6.5 million to almost 250 mil-
lion.25 
4. THE THIRD PHASE – A DEGREE OF UNDER-REGULATION
I think we are now in the third phase – a phase characterised by a degree of 
under-regulation  –  and  due  to  two  significant  developments  in  2010 
I would put that year as the starting point for the third phase. Courts and le-
gislators around the world seem to have accepted the impossibility of view-
ing an online presence as an indication of an intention to do business with 
the world at large. This is of course acceptable. However, it seems there is 
a tendency to be so overly eager to avoid too broad jurisdictional claims so 
24 Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme [2001] N.D.Cal 169 F. Supp. 
2d 1181  p. 22.  See also:  Yahoo!,  Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme 
[2006] 9th Cir. 433 F.3d 1199.
25 Zakon,R.H. date ?, Hobbes' Internet Timeline 10.1,  
http://www.zakon.org.robert/internet/timeline/, (Accessed 14 December 2011).
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as to end up with a degree of under-regulation. A recent ECJ case is illus-
trative.
In  2010,  the  ECJ  addressed  the  two  cases  of  Pammer  v  Reederei  Karl  
Schlüter GmbH & KG26 and  Hotel Alpenhof GesmbH v Oliver Heller27 jointly. 
The key question common to the two cases was whether the fact that a web-
site can be consulted on the Internet in the Member State of the consumer’s 
domicile  is  sufficient  to justify a finding that  commercial  or professional 
activities  are being directed to that Member State within the meaning of 
Article 15(1)(c) of Regulation No 44/2001. The Court concluded that: 
• The mere fact that a website can be accessed in the consumer’s 
jurisdiction  does  not  mean  that  the  business  has  directed  its 
activities to that state;28 and
• Whether a trader has directed its activity to the Member State of 
the consumer’s domicile, should be ascertained by reference to 
“whether,  before the conclusion of any contract with the con-
sumer, it is apparent from those websites and the trader’s over-
all activity that the trader was envisaging doing business with 
consumers domiciled in one or more Member States, including 
the Member State of that consumer’s domicile, in the sense that 
it was minded to conclude a contract with them.”29
The first of these conclusions, while sensible as such, is irrelevant for the 
cases at hand. Both the  Pammer case and the  Hotel Alpenhof case involved 
contractual situations, as can be expected when the disputes relate to the 
proper interpretation of an Article addressing contracts concluded by con-
sumers. Thus, we are here not dealing with the more or less randomness of 
contact and risk typical of claims relating e.g. to marketing practises or oth-
er non-contractual situations.
In other words, it must be remembered that the only situation in which 
the matter of whether a business has directed its activities to the consumer’s 
state arises, is where that business has entered into a contract with the con-
sumer. To me, it seems contrary to intuition to conclude that a business that 
has contracted with a consumer did not, at least prima facie, direct its activit-
ies to the consumer’s state. Thus, the existence of a contract between the 
26 [2008] Case C-585/08.
27 [2009] Case C-144/09.
28 [2010] joined Cases C- 585/08 and C- 144/09 para 95.
29 [2010] Joined cases para 95.
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business and the consumer should give rise to a strong, but rebuttable, pre-
sumption that the business  directed its  activities  to the consumer’s state. 
That is; in every case where a business has contracted with a consumer in 
another Member State, it should be presumed that the business has directed 
its  activities  to  that  Member  State.  After  all,  the  business  has  made  the 
choice to reap the benefits of contracting with a consumer from that Mem-
ber State. 
Linking this to the main topic of this paper, I suggest that, the approach 
taken by the ECJ in Pammer/Hotel Alpenhof heralds a new era characterised 
by a fear of making too broad jurisdictional claims resulting in a degree of 
under-regulation. 
Another important component of the emerging under-regulation is ex-
emplified in the US’ recent adoption on 10 August 2010 of a federal statute 
seeking to address what the US perceives as ‘libel tourism’. 30 The key fea-
ture of the statute is to make mandatory the nonrecognition of foreign de-
famation  judgments  that  are  seen  as  inconsistent  with  the  First  Amend-
ment’s protection of free speech. With actual enforcement being such a cent-
ral  component in  the proper functioning of the private international  law 
machinery, the approach taken by the US is doubtlessly a step in the direc-
tion of under-regulation. The obvious risk is that this initiative prompts the 
response that other countries implement similar non-recognition legislation 
as to areas of law they do not trust how US courts adjudicate matters. In 
other words, the US initiative may spark a downward spiral effect.
5. THE FOURTH PHASE – EQUILIBRIUM?
So where to next? If it is conceded that we currently are in a third phase 
characterised by a degree of under-regulation, we may ask what will  re-
place this phase when it comes to an end. Because one thing is for certain,  
phases such as those discussed here come and go like the seasons, or like 
fashions.
One possible future development is that the pendulum again swings too 
far  and we  end up  with  a  degree  of  overregulation.  However,  the  aim 
should of course be to reach the state of a well  balanced regulation that 
amount neither to overregulation, nor to under-regulation.
30 See further: Barbour, E.C. 2010,  The SPEECH Act: The Federal Response to “Libel Tourism”  , 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41417.pdf, (Accessed 14 December 2011).
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For the past 7 years, I have been arguing that such equilibrium can be 
found through the combination of a dis-targeting focus and the widespread 
utilisation of so-called geo-location technologies. I will here only repeat the 
key characteristics of such an approach, briefly.
There are sufficiently accurate so-called geo-location technologies avail-
able that can be used to ascertain the geographical location of Internet users. 
That this is so is easily proven by reference to the number of occasions the 
geographical  location  of  the  Internet  user  affects  the  content  that  is  
provided.  
Interestingly, in addition to server-side geo-location technologies, such 
as technical means for connecting an IP address with a physical location, 
due to the increasing use of portable devices such as smart phones and tab-
lets, we must now also take account of client-side geo-location provided e.g. 
through GPS devices and signal triangulation.
There can be no doubt that geo-location technologies are, and have been 
for some time, sufficiently accurate to be taken into account by the law. It is  
regrettable  that  lawyers,  legal  academics,  courts  and legislators  so  often 
have chosen to turn a ‘blind eye’ to this technical development.
Dis-targeting is a simple concept – we should focus on whether any reas-
onable steps have been taken to avoid contact with the particular jurisdic-
tion in question. That is, where no such steps have been taken, it may be 
valid to prima facie assume that the content provider was aiming at that jur-
isdiction (at least as one amongst several jurisdictions being aimed at).
Taken together, the use of geo-location technologies and the focus on 
dis-targeting,  would  provide  a  high  level  of  predictability  and  party 
autonomy. Further, flexibility would be available were required through the 
attention being placed on the taking of “reasonable steps”.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
As is the case with any writings on historical events, the parts above that fo-
cus on what has been can only ever provide a subjective account of what 
has happened since the introduction of the WWW. It is subjective in that 
certain events are emphasised instead of others, and it is subjective in that I  
have had to interpret those events to describe their overall significance. Fur-
ther, concerns can also be raised against the parts of the above that seek to 
predict the future as doing so is difficult and, thus, my guesses may quite 
simply turn out to be wrong. 
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However, even given these obvious limitations, I think it is worthwhile 
to, at this point in time, reflect on how much, and how little, has happened 
over the past 20 years in the field of private international law as applied to 
the Internet.
The discussion above lends itself to several conclusions. The sceptic may 
argue that it shows that, while we have travelled far, we have in fact gotten 
nowhere, which typically is the case when one moves in circles. There is no 
doubt validity in such a conclusion. However, if  we adopt the views ex-
pressed in John Perry Barlow’s Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace as 
our starting point, it must be said that considerable development has taken 
place.
Two additional  observations can be made in the context of what pro-
gress has been made. First, despite a widespread recognition of the com-
plexities  specifically  associated  with  the  Internet,  there  are  very  few ex-
amples of Internet-specific  private international law rules.  However, per-
haps this is changing. For example, on 28 October 2010, the Standing Com-
mittee of China’s National People’s Congress adopted the Law of the People’s  
Republic of China on the Application of Law for Foreign-Related Civil Relations . 
That law came into effect on 1 April 2011. Article 46 deals specifically with 
Internet defamation:
Where such personal rights as the right of name, portrait, reputation and 
privacy are infringed upon via network or by other means, the laws at the 
habitual residence of the infringed shall apply.31 
Another recent example of a technology-specific approach can be found 
in the recent joined cases of eDate Advertising GmbH v X32 and Olivier Mar-
tinez, Robert Martinez v MGN Ltd,33 where the ECJ dealt with online publica-
tions differently to offline publications. Perhaps this is signalling the end of 
an  almost  religious  adherence  to  the  so-called  ‘technology  neutral’  ap-
proach. 
Second, given the tremendous amount of international interactions that 
take place on a daily basis online, there are few court cases dealing with jur-
isdictional claims over Internet conduct. The obvious explanation for this is 
found  in  the  significant  costs  and  complexities  that  are  associated  with 
31 Law of  the  People’s  Republic  of  China on the Application of  Law for  Foreign-Re-
lated Civil Relations 2011, Article 46.
32 [2011] Referring court Bundesgerichtshof Germany Case C-509/09.
33 [2011] Referring court Tribunal de grande instance de Paris France Case C-161/10. 
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cross-border ligation. Thus, the absence of heard cases cannot be seen as an 
indication of a lack of disputes, and should of course not be seen as an in-
dication that the issue of jurisdiction in Cyberspace is lacking in importance.
However, the most important conclusion may be that the attitude adop-
ted by the law, at least as regards to the regulation of jurisdictional claims, 
has a very limited impact on technological developments. How else would 
one explain that, the number of websites increased approximately 38 times 
(from approximately 6.5 million to almost 250 million) during the second 
phase characterised by harsh legal attitudes? 
Having said that, this conclusion should not prevent us from trying to 
construct the ‘best’ jurisdictional rules possible.
